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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
-v-
GARY L. ELLIS AND MARTY 
WITHERS 
Defendants/Anpellants 
Case No. 20307 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an apneal from a judgment against nary L. Ellis 
and Marty R. Withers for burglary of a dwelling, a second 
degree felony. A jury found them guilty following a trial 
on August 1, 1934, in the Third District Court, in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson, Judge, presiding. They were both sentenced to serve 
a term of one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison. 
The execution of the sentences was stayed and they were nlaced 
on probation. 
Statement of Pacts 
Prior to trial a Motion in Limine and a Motion to 
Sever was heard and denied by the Court.(R.28,29,38,47,48,49.) 
At trial the following evidence was ellicited. A burglar 
alarm at the home of Vivian Armstrong went off on the night of 
April 7, 1984. She was out of town and the caretaker in her 
absence, Bruce Austin, went to the premises. (T.I 3-8) 
T 
T.I.refers to trial transcript of July 30, 1934 and T.II referred 
to trial transcript of August 1, 1984. 
Mr. Austin was a former police officer of 26 years (T.I 30). 
When he arrived at 4:20 a.m. he observed a broken window which 
had not been broken the day before (T.I 12-13), and although 
there was valuable property in the home, none was disturbed or 
missing (T.I 13,19). He observed an apparent bloodstain on 
the curtain of the broken window (T.I 15,35) and^muddy footprints 
inside the window leading to a sliding glass door (opened 2 
inches) and back again to the window (T.I 18,19). Mr. Austin testifi* 
over objection,that there were two different sets of footprints 
outside the broken window; one a pointed western boot, the 
other a running shoe or tennis type shoe (T.I 20-22). He 
identified photographs (State's exhibits 4,5 and 6) of footprints 
as accurately depicting what he observed, (T.I 23,24). He 
further testified over objection that the print of the boot 
outside and inside looked the same (T.I 49). 
Dennis Thayne was the first police officer to arrive 
at the scene of the burglary. While he was standing outside 
the house,five minutes after he arrived and nine minutes after 
he was dispatched (T.I 90,91),he observed a car with a loud 
exhaust, distinctive in color (black over yellow with a red 
door), drive past the house. He saw the driver turn and look 
at him and then accelerate (T.I 59). He saw at least two 
people in the front seat but couldn't recognize the driver 
(T.I 58,81). He called in a description of the car as a 
"suspicious vehicle" (T.I 60). 
In the course of his investigation inside the premises, 
Officer Thayne found broken glass in the muddy prints (T.I 70). 
There were no fingerprints found, but soil samples were collected 
(T.87-90). 
Police Officer Ken Schoney received a dispatch about 
the suspicious car. When he saw such a car not far from the 
scene of the burglary (T.I 106) he pursued it, at one noint lost 
it for 20 seconds, but then saw it parked (T.I 97-102). As 
he approached the car he saw defendant Ellis lying down in the front 
seat and defendant Withers lying down in the back (T.I 103,104). 
Mr. Withers was wearing tennis shoes, his levis were soaked 
to the knee (T.I 110-111). He stated his name was Marty Wolfe 
(T.I 116). Over objection Officer Schoney testified that at 
4:30 a.m. (T.I 117),when he asked Withers what he was doing 
sleeping in the back of the car, Withers stated he had been 
asleep in the back seat of the vehicle which had been parked 
since midnight. When he separately asked Ellis how long he had 
been there, Ellis said ten to fifteen minutes. Ellis1 nants 
were not wet and he had on black boots. The car engine was 
slightly warm to the touch. (T.I 118-120). 
Defense counsel made a Motion in Limine and preferred 
the testimony of Bob Baldwin, an expert in the identification 
of footprints whose report after examining the photos of the 
footprints was "... there was insufficient detail present to 
make any determination of tread design or size11. (T.I 129). 
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Defense counsel then moved to strike Mr. Austin's testimony 
concerning his eyeball comparison of the footprints. The 
court held that a lay witness could testify to what he saw 
to wit: that the prints appeared to him to be similar (T.132), 
but that he would not allow any officer to testify that those 
footprints apnear to be made by those shoes (T.I 135) Further 
Officer Schoney testified that after he first saw the defendants' 
parked car he radioed for assistance and while waiting for 
approximately five minutes observed no movement in the car. 
During his investigation he observed some pieces of glass on 
the floor of the vehicle and on Mr. Ellis' boot (T.II 13). He 
also found a napkin over the driver's visor with blood spots 
(T.II 14). He confiscated,at the jail,Mr. Ellis' pants which 
he described as dirty with lots of mud around the bottoms. He 
said they were damp, but unot wet or dry!l (T.II 21,22). 
Officer Shupe testified that the person in the back 
was under a blanket (T.II 44). He said Mr. Ellis had a cut on 
his forefinger (T.II 45), but when asked Mr. Ellis said nothing 
was wrong with his hand (T.II 48). The officer described the 
wound as "somewhat jagged, superficial,with dried blood 
approximately one inch long and varying one quarter to one 
half inch wide in its width (T.II 50). Officer Kim Herbert 
testified that he heard Mr. Withers say he had passed out 
around midnight in West Valley City (T.II 69,87). He also saw the 
prints in the mud and could recall seeing only one set of prints 
(T.II 79). 
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A stipulation was entered into and read into the 
record that particles of glass taken from the scene of the 
burglary both outside and inside and from the defendants' 
vehicle and Mr. Ellis1 boot did not match the glass at the 
scene of the burglary (T.II 91). Counsel further stipulated 
that soil samples from the defendantsf car and shoes and 
from the scene of the burglary were not analyzed (T.II 92). 
Also blood was drawn from Mr. Ellis and it was type A blood 
(T.II 92). The blood on the napkin in the car was type 
AB and thus not the blood of Ellis (T.II 93). An expert 
witness testified that the blood on the curtain was human 
blood (T.II 100) and that it was her opinion that it was 
type A blood but that because of the nature of the sample 
she could not be positive (T.II 105). Since there was not 
a sufficient sample to test for the five enzvme groupings, 
she could only say the sample was consistent with type A, 
and thus consistent with 40% of Caucasians (T.II 115). 
Robert Baldwin, a footprint identification expert 
was asked to do a comparison of the anaellants1 footwear with 
pictures of footprints taken at the scene. The results 
were inconclusive; he could not say it was not the shoe, and 
could not say it was (T.II 123) . He was asked if he would 
be able, when called to the scene of the crime to compare 
footprint impression which he observed with a shoe and be able 
to say they were the same. He answered that that would depend 
on the quality of the shoe impression, but that in terms of 
scientific identification, "one doesn't generally use one's 
eyes to compare the original impression in the mind. Generally 
you have to do a one to one comparison for size purposes 
and use a magnifying glass in looking at fine nicks and gouges ." 
(T.II 125,126) He testified that to make a comparison "you 
have to have a pattern that: is sufficient to exclude" (T.II 128), 
After the close of the State's evidence, counsel for 
both defendants moved to dismiss for lack of sufficient 
evidence. This motion was denied (T.II 140,141,146). The 
court did clarify to the jury in what regards they should treat 
Mr. Austin's testimony concerning the footprints he observed. 
"He can't give an opinion because he doesn't have expertise 
in the field, but he can say what he saw and what appeared to 
him to be similar" (T.II 148). 
Larry Withers, Marty Withers' father, testified for the 
defense, that he had seen his son at 10:00 p.m. that night 
at his home in West Valley City with another person, not Mr. 
Ellis (T.II 148-150), At that time, he said, Marty was very 
drunk, he was so drunk he was staggering and he borrowed some 
money to get some more to drink (T.II 150-151). Mr. Withers 
said Marty had entered a alcohol program under the name of 
Marty Wolfe because he had some outstanding traffic warrants 
(T.II 150-154). 
At the close of all the evidence defense counsel both 
moved for a directed verdict of acquital due to the 
insufficiency of the evidence. This motion was denied. 
They also objected to certain instructions (T.II 159). The 
jury found the appellants guilty as charged (R.54). 
Both counsel filed motions to arrest judgment 
(R. 118,119,120). On October 3, 1984 the motion on behalf 
of Mr. Ellis was heard and denied (Transcript October 3, 1984 
R. 440-461). On March 15, 1985 the motion on behalf of Mr. 
Withers was heard and denied (R.4, Marty Withers record 
before consolidation,Supreme Court No. 20631). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The first argument on appeal is that the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying the defendants f motion for 
severance, after it had ruled that the defendants1 inconsistent 
and incriminating out of court statements could be admitted 
at trial under an exception to the hearsay rule. The lower 
court's refusal to sever the defendants' joint trial subjected 
each defendant to substantial and unwarranted prejudice because 
the inconsistent statements came into evidence in a form not 
subject to cross-examination: the court's refusal to sever 
stripped the defendants of their Sixth Amendment rights to 
confrontation and effective assistance of counsel. 
The second argument on appeal is that the lower 
court erred in allowing a lay witness to give opinion testimony 
which only an expert could meaningfully have given. The 
court allowed the security officer who had responsibility for 
the house allegedly burglarized by the defendants to make 
statements about the similarity of certain footprints on the 
premises and about the similarity between police photographs 
of the footprints and the defendants f footwear taken from 
them at the time of their arrest. The Utah Rules of Evidence 
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precluded this witness from giving the opinion testimony allowed 
by the court below. The lower court, in effect, permitted 
a lay witness to appear to the jury to be an expert by allowing 
him to make comparisons he could not meaningfully make about 
the footprints. 
The third issue presented on appeal is that the trial 
court erred in denying the defendants1 motions to arrest judgment 
on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence. The case 
presented by the prosecution was 100 percent circumstantial; 
the state's evidence that each defendant committed the actus 
reus and possessed the requisite mens rea of second degree 
burglary could not have led reasonable minds to foreclose all 
of the interpretations of the evidence consistent with the 
defendants' innocence. The verdict in the trial below was 
a product of an overzealous jury and should have been laid 
aside by the court. 
The fourth argument on appeal is that the trial court 
erred in refusing to read to the jury the defendants' requested 
alternative reasonable hypothesis instruction. The state's 
case against the co-defendants was 100 percent circumstantial. 
Therefore, when the jury was given a mere reasonable doubt 
instruction, its members were not invested with an adequate 
sense of their responsibility to exclude all reasonable 
theories of the facts consistent with the innocence of the 
defendants before returning a guilty verdict. 
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ARGIF1ENTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
BY DEFYING THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR SEVERANCE. 
At the time of their arrest, the defendants made 
conflicting statements to the arresting officer concerning 
their activities on the night in question. Mr. Ellis told 
the officer that he and Mr. Withers had been out drinking 
and driving around all night and that they had been parked at 
their present location for 10 to 15 minutes (T.120). Mr. 
Withers told the officer that the car had been parked in its 
present location for four hours and that he (Mr. Withers) had 
been passed out in the back seat all that time (T.18). 
Once the trial court had ruled, at a pre-trial motion, 
that the co-defendants1 inconsistent statements could be testified 
to by the arresting officer under an exception to the hearsay 
rule, the court then denied the defendants1 joint and timely 
motion for severance (R.482). 2 (Addendum A) The defendants respectfully 
submit that this denial constituted an abuse of judicial discretion. 
Because the inconsistent and incriminating statements of the 
defendants were admitted at trial in a form not subject to 
^hus. it should be noted that the trial court was fully aware 
of the nature of the defendants1 inconsistent statements before 
trial began: just prior to argument on the motion to sever, defense 
counsel for Gary Lynn Ellis made a Motion in Limine to exclude the 
statement made by Mr. Ellis at the time of his arrest (refered to 
in the first paragram of Point I). (R.464) 
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cross-examination, the defendants were effectively denied their 
Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation and effective assistance 
of counsel. 
The Utah statute regarding joinder and severance of 
defendants is Utah Code Annotated §77-35-9 (1953 as amended). The 
applicable sections state: 
(b) Two or more defendants may be charged in the 
same indictment or information if they are alleged 
to have participated in the same act or conduct 
in the same criminal episode. 
Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts 
together or separately and all of the defendants need 
not be charged in each account. 
When two or more defendants are jointly charged with 
any offense, they shall be tried jointly unless the 
court in its discretion, on motion or otherwise, orders 
separate trials consistent with the interests of justice, 
(emphasis added). 
(d) If it appears that a defendant or the prosecution 
is prejudicied by the joinder of offenses or defendants 
in an indictment or information, or by a joinder for 
trial together, the court shall order an election of 
separate trials of separate counts, or grant a severance 
of defendants, or provide such other relief as justice 
requires. 
This jurisdiction's standard for determining whether 
a trial court has abused its discretion in denying severance 
is still evolving. 
In State v. Rivenburgh, 11 Utah 2d 95, 355 P.2d 689, 698 
(Utah 1960), this court stated: 
When two or more defendants are jointly charged with 
any offense, they shall be tried jointly, unless the 
court in its discretion orders separate trials. If the 
ruling of the court deprives the defendant of a fair 
trial, then the judge has abused his discretion. The 
discretion may not be exercised arbitrarily. 
In State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1350 (Utah 1977), 
this court added fl...[a]s a general rule, joinder of defendants 
is the procedure employed when...it^appears that persons were 
jointly involved in the commission of a crime so that the 
evidence against one is largely applicable to the other." 
And finally in State v. Collins, 612 P.2d 775, 777 
(Utah 1980), this court presented its most recent clarification 
of and addition to the abuse of discretion standard: 
The trial court must, when defendants are charged 
jointly, weigh possible prejudice to any defendant 
with considerations of economy and practicalities 
of judicial administration. Doubts concerning 
prejudice should be resolved by the trial court in 
favor of a defendant, but the trial court must be 
accorded some discretion in denying a motion for 
severance. A denial will be reversed by this 
Court only if a defendant's right to a fair trial 
has been impaired. 
In Collins, this court refused to reverse the lower 
court's denial of severance for two reasons: 
A substantial part of the evidence and testimony 
offered by the State was relevant to charges 
against each of the defendants... Equally important, 
none of the defenses of either accused was antagonistic 
to the interests of any co-defendant. 
Significantly, the issue of a denial of a right to 
confrontation was not before this court in Collins. The two 
grounds for reversal--(1) that a substantial part of the evidence 
is not relevant to charges against each defendant, and (2) that 
the defendants are pursuing antagonistic defenses—announced by 
the decision, then cannot be viewed as the sole criteria upon 
which to base a reversal. Indeed, Bruton v. United States, 391 
U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed 476 (1968), indicates a further 
basis for reversal which must be granted significant importance 
when weighed against considerations of economy and the practicalities 
of judicial administration. 
In Bruton the Supreme Court held that out of court 
statements and confessions made by a co-defendant which incriminate 
another defendant violate the defendant's right of confrontation 
unless the declarant co-defendant takes the stand and is subject 
to cross-examination. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 133, 134 
(1968). The evidence in Bruton, like the evidence in the present 
case, was admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule as to 
the declarant co-defendant. The Supreme Court indicated that 
because the person making the statement could not be placed on 
the stand and tested by the cross-examination, the introduction 
of an incriminating hearsay statement violated the defendant's 
right to confront and cross-examine x^ itnesses . 
In the case before this court, the contradictory out 
of court statements allegedly made by the defendants came into 
court via the testimony of the arresting officer. (T.118-120) 
The adverse and incriminating implications raised by the admission 
of this evidence were at least significant factors in prompting 
the jury to return a guilty verdict against the defendants. 
Therefore, by allowing this evidence to come before the jury 
untested and untried by defense counsel, the trial court stripped 
the defendants' of their rights of confrontation under the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. No amount 
of savings in terms of judicial economy can warrant the cost 
of denying a defendant his essential Sixth Amendment rights. 
If severance had been granted below, each defendant's 
out of court statement would have been ruled hearsay with in the 
context of the other defendant's trial. The statements made 
by each defendant concerning the other defendant's activities 
on the night in question could not be testified to by the 
arresting officer at the defendant's separate trials. Such 
testimony would constitute hearsay in its classic form. Severance, 
then, would clearly have remedied the significant prejudice the 
at least partially hearsay statements in this case caused each 
of the co-defendants. And the alleviation of such prejudice by 
means of the mechanism of severance is precisely what Bruton 
calls for in a case such as this. Where out of court statements 
made by defendants who will not take the witness stand incriminate 
the defendants by virtue of being inconsistent, and where these 
statements are used by the state as circumstantial evidence that 
both the defendants possessed the requisite state of mind for 
the crime charged, the inability of defense counsel to in any 
way cross examine this evidence effectively denies the defendants 
their Sixth Amendment rights of confrontation and effective 
assistance of counsel. Fairness dictates that severance should be 
granted where a defendant is denied his right to confrontation. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING A LAY 
WITNESS TO GIVE EXPERT OPlNIOti TESTIMONY. 
At trial, the state called Bruce Austin, the security 
officer who had responsibility for the residence allegedly broken 
into by the defendants. The prosecution asked Mr. Austin to 
testify as to the similarity between the footprints outside 
the house and those mud stains on the carpet inside the house 
(T.48). Mr. Austin was also allowed to remark that the footprints 
outside the house, as rendered in police photographs, appeared 
similar to .that of a boot and running shoe, footwear taken 
from defendants at the time of their arrest (T.I 22) .Defendants f 
counsel immediately objected to the admissibility of this lay 
opinion evidence (T.20). Further, defendants1 counsel made a 
Motion in Limine asking that the jury be told not to consider 
any lay testimony about the similarity between the footprints 
in the police photogranhs and the defendants1 footwear (T.128-131). 
The objection was overruled and the motion was denied (T.132). 
However, at the sentencing hearing for Gary Ellis, the court 
questioned its rulings: 
The court would state this: The argument by 
the defense, the Court is impressed with one 
point, and that is the question as far as the 
police officer and the testimony he gave. The 
Court made an explanation, as I recall, I 
made an explanation to the jury after that took 
place. And it was not the Court's intention 
that that particular individual give his opinion. 
He did state, though, my opinion is so and so. 
I think the explanation was made to the jury that 
he could state what he saw, what he observed 
concerning it. But I think that is a matter 
that the Supreme Court, if it goes to them, would 
have an opportunity to look at and make a 
determination of whether the evidence did come in, 
there wasn't sufficient explanation to correct it, 
if it was wrong. As I say, the Court does have 
some question on that (R. 454). 
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Certainly, opinion evidence may be given by either a 
lay or expert witness. However, the Appellants1 claim that the 
lay testimony in question should have been admitted into evidence 
because Mr. Austin was giving an opinion about something he 
could not evaluate meaningfully: the witness was not an expert 
in the comparison of footprints. Defense counsel did submit, 
on stipulation, the statement of an expert in footprint 
comparison and in this statement the expert concluded that there 
was no way to compare the poor quality police photographs with 
the tread on the defendants1 footwear (T.11,123). Mr, Austin's 
lay opinion was, at best, of slight probative value with respect 
to any factual issue in the case. Nevertheless, the very real 
possibility exists that the lay testimony given by this former 
police officer and security specialist was construed as expert--
or quasi-expert—opinion by the jury and was thus accorded 
significance far beyond its evidentiary value. The defendants 
contend that the admission of this testimony constitutes 
significant prejudicial error. 
The Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) provide: 
Rule 701. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses. 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, 
his testimony in the form of opinion or 
inferences is limited to those opinions or 
inferences which are (a) rationally based on 
the perception of the witness and (b) helpful 
to a clear understanding of his testimony or 
the determination of a fact in issue. 
There are no Utah cases affording standards by which 
to apply Rule 701. A standard was articulated for Rule 56 (1) 
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of the old Utah Rules of Evidence, however, and this standard 
readily applies to Rule 701. In Arnovitz v. Telia, 495 P.2d 
310, 311 (Utah 1972), this court said: 
It is generally recognized that opinions or 
conclusions of ordinary witnesses derived 
from common experience and observation of 
things which persons generally are capable 
of comprehending and understanding are 
admissible in evidence when the nature of 
the subject-matter is such that it cannot 
be reproduced or detailed to the jury 
precisely as it appeared to the witness 
at the time, or where it is not practicable 
to lay before the jury the primary or 
constituent facts, so that they can draw 
the proper inferences and form an intelligent 
j udgment. 
The Appellants contend that the photographs of the 
footprints taken at the scene of the crime are sufficiently 
detailed to enable the jury to see what Mr. Austin saw 
"precisely as it appeared to [him] at the time.fT If the 
police investigation team was remiss in obtaining adequate 
photographs of the mudstains inside the house, then admittedly 
this would be a situation "where it is not practicable to 
lay before the jury the primary or constituent facts" without 
opinion testimony. However, the Appellants must stridently 
contend that the kind of comparison the court allowed Mr. 
Austin to make--a comparison as to the "similarity" of the 
different sets of footprints--is one which could meaningfully 
be made, and reported to the jury, only by an expert. There 
was no foundation laid at trial that Mr. Austin had ever had 
any training in footprint comparison. The prosecution simply 
asked the witness, as an entirely lay observer, to comment on 
the similarity between the sets of footprints (T.20-30). Mr. 
Austin did not possess sufficient expertise even to report 
that the footprints were "similar". Furthermore, an expert's 
comparison, in order to be valid, would have to involve more 
than the casual, cursory examination Mr. Austin was able to 
afford the evidence. (T.20-30) 
Mr. Austin's testimony cannot be viewed as "rationally 
based on [his] perception." Rule 701(a) mandates exclusion 
of this opinion testimony. Similarly, Rule 701(b) works to 
exclude the lay testimony because Mr. Austin's opinion as to 
the similarity between the footprints inside and outside of 
the house could not validly further the prosecution's proof 
that either Mr. Withers or Mr. Ellis was in the house on the 
night in question; the lay opinion was decidedly not "helpful... 
to the determination of a fact in issue." Rule 701(b), Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1983 as amended). Given a jury's probable 
tendency to invest great importance in a former police officer's 
testimony as to the similarity between two objects, a court 
should carefully limit or exclude such lay comparisons. 
In light of the trial court's hindsight doubt about 
its decision to overrule the defendants' objections to the 
testimony in question, and in light of the contention that the 
testimony is inadmissible under Rule 701, Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1983) , the Appellants respectfully submit that the 
prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed its probative 
value. 
-17-
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT 
ON THE BASIS OF INSUFFICIENCY OF THE 
EVIDENCE . * 
Gary Lynn Ellis and Marty R, Withers were jointly 
convicted of second degree burglary. Prior to Mr. Ellis' 
sentencing, counsel for the defendants filed separate motions 
to arrest judgment on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence 
(AddendumB). The motions were denied (R.454), (R.4) 3. The 
jury verdict as to both defendants in the case should be 
overturned because the prosecution1 s evidence, even when 
stretched to its reasonable limits, is insufficient to establish 
that either defendant is guilty of second degree burglary. 
The power of this Court to review the sufficiency 
of the evidence supporting a guilty verdict is well established. 
In State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 442, 444 (Utah 1983), this Court 
stated, "...not withstanding the presumptions in favor of the 
jury's decision this Court: still has the right to review the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict." Further, 
the Court noted: 
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime for which he was convicted. Id. at 444. 
C^his cite is to the trial record of State v. Marty Withers, 
District Court CR84-501, Supreme Court #20631 also #20307. 
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The evidence must be reviewed in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 
842 (Utah 1982). Even stretching the evidence to its logical 
limit, however, the court may not take a speculative leap to 
bridge the gap between the evidence needed to convict and the 
evidence actually presented at trial. State v. Petree, 659 
P.2d 443, 445. 
In State v. Lamm, 606 ^.2d 229, 234-35 (Utah 1980), 
the dissent notied: 
If the circumstances essential for conviction 
are ambiguous and consistent with the innocence 
of the accused, then this Court must hold as 
a matter of law that there is not substantial 
evidence to support the guilt of the accused. 
This standard restates the Due Process requirements 
which prohibit a criminal conviction in all cases except upon 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which a defendant is charged. 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); In re Winship, 
397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
The statues pertinent to this issue are: 
Burglary--(1) A person is guilty of burglary 
if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building 
or any portion of a building with intent to 
commit a felony or theft or commit an assault 
on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree 
unless it was committed in a dwelling, in which 
event it is a felony of the second degree. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202 (1953 as amended). 
Definitions—For the purposes of this part: 
... (2) "Dwelling" means a building which is 
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usually occupied by a person lodging therein 
at night, whether or not a person is actually 
present. 
(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" 
in or upon premises when the premises or any 
portion thereof at: the time of the entry or 
remaining are not open to the public and when the 
actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged 
to enter or remain on the premises or such 
portion thereof. 
(4) "Enter11 means: 
(a) Intrusion of any part of the body; or 
(b) Intrusion of any physical object under 
control of the actor. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-201 (1953 as amended). 
It is clear that Che state must provide evidence 
regarding both the act (unlawful entry) and the intent 
(to commit a felony, theft or an assault while within the 
dwelling). The state must put forth evidence proving, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Ellis and Mr. Withers entered 
the home on Harvard Avenue unlawfully, and that, while inside 
the home, they intended to commit a felony, theft or an 
assault. The Appellants contend that even when viewed in 
the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the prosecution's 
evidence is insufficient to establish that they were inside 
the allegedly burglarized home on the night in question, let 
alone that they were inside that home fully possessed of 
the requisite mens rea for second degree burglary. 
A. 
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT 
TO ESTABLISH, BEYOND A REASONABI^H)OUBT, 
THAT THE DEFENDANTS COMMITTED THE ACTUS 
REUS OF THE CRIME CHARGED. 
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As defense counsel for Mr, Ellis stated when 
arguing for the motion to arrest judgment, "this was a very 
circumstantial case [;] there was absolutelv no direct 
evidence as to these two people [the defendants] being in 
that home on that evening." (R.442) The trial Judge agreed, 
"...the case...is based mainly, maybe a hundred percent, on 
circumstantial evidence." (R.446) 
A review of the trial transcripts and opposing counsel's 
arguments in the motion to arrest judgment indicates that the 
strongest evidence for the state was that shortly after the 
police had responded to the burglar alarm, a distinctively 
colored vehicle (purportedly the one the defendants were found 
in) drove slowly past the house in question and then sped off 
when it reached the intersection at the end of the street. The 
remainder of the state's circumstantial evidence bearing upon 
the actus reus consisted of lay opinion as to the similarity 
of various footprints, (T.20-30) lay comparison of the 
defendantsfs footwear and poor quality police photographs, (T.22) 
and a blood stain on the curtain behind a broken window in the 
house (T.15). When added together, this evidence cannot 
reasonably foreclose all explanations of the facts except the 
one that says the defendants broke into the home. 
Because too many alternative reasonable theories of 
the prosecution's facts, consistent with the innocence of the 
defendants, exist, the state did not carry its burden of proof. 
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B. 
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT 
TO ESTABLISH THAT THE DEFENDANTS 
POSSESSED THE ME1NS REA OF THE CRIME CHARGED. 
Utah has extensive case law on the intent requirement 
for burglary. In State v. Brooks, 631 P. 2d 878, 881 (Utah 
1981), this Court stated that the intent to commit a felony, 
theft, or assault must be proven, or circumstances must be 
shown from which the intent may reasonably be inferred. It 
is recognized that because intent is a state of mind, it is 
rarely susceptible to direct proof. Therefore, the intent 
to steal while unlawfully entering a dwelling can be inferred 
by the conduct and the circumstances presented at trial, in 
light of human experience. 
Thus, in State v. Sisneros, 631 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 
1981), this Court held that "[w]hen one breaks and enters 
a building in the nighttime, without consent, an inference 
may be drawn that he did so to commit larceny." Other acts 
sufficient to raise this inference of intent include a showing 
that the defendant entered an apartment by ladder at night and 
fled, leaving his car behind, when officers arrived, State v. 
Hopkins, 11 Utah 2d 363, 359 P.2d 486 (Utah 1961); a showing 
that the defendant was caught in a closed store at night near 
the store's safe with a drill and drill bits, People v. Morton, 
4 Utah 407, 11 P.512 (Utah 1886). See also State v. Syddall, 
20 Utah 2d 73, 433 P.2d L0 (Utah 1967) (nighttime breaking 
and entering raises inference of intent)^ State v. Tellay, 
7 Utah 2d 308, 324 P.2d 490 (Utah 1958) (nighttime breaking 
and entering raises inference); and State v. Evans, 279 P.950 
(Utah 1929) (nighttime breaking and entering raises inference). 
Most recently, in State v. Wilson, 701 P.2d 1058 (Utah 
1985) , this court held that direct evidence showing the 
defendant broke a window to gain entry into a locked building 
reasonably gave rise to the inference that he intended to commit 
theft therein. The per curiam decision pointed out that ?f[t]he 
fact nothing was missed when he [the defendant] was apprehended 
is no defense to the burglary charge, nor does it destroy the 
inference of intent to steal at the time of entry.ff Id.at 1060. 
The state has the burden of proving that the defendants, 
in the case before this Court, unlawfully entered the home in 
question with the requisite intent to commit a theft or other 
felony. As the cases cited above point out, this intent can 
be inferred if evidence of conduct or circumstances is 
presented making such an inference reasonable. But no such 
evidence was presented in this case. In each of the cases 
cited above, the lower courts allowed an inference of intent 
to be drawn from clear and direct indications that the respective 
defendants had unlawfully entered a building. In the present 
case, Mr. Withers and Mr. Ellis were not caught in the residence 
in question. Nobody saw them enter or leave the home. No 
burglary tools or instruments were entered into evidence. There 
was no evidence of a plan or scheme or commit theft, such as 
testimony, accomplices, etc. 
Because of the state's failure to proffer even prima 
facie direct evidence that the defendants entered the home, the 
state has failed to provide prima facie evidence as to the 
existence of an intent to commit theft at the time of the 
alleged entrance into the home. The defendants respectfully 
submit that reasonable minds could not differ: guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt was not a verdict warranted by the evidence 
adduced in the court below. The court erred in denying 
defense counsel's motions to arrest judgment on the basis of 
insufficiency of the evidence. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
GIVE THE DEFEiffiMTS^^QUESTED JURY" 
INSTRUCTION. 
The state's case against Gary Lynn Ellis and Marty 
R. Withers was entirely circumstantial (see p. 21 supra). 
Given this fact, the Court below committed reversible error 
when it refused to give the alternative reasonable hypothesis 
instruction requested by defense counsel (T.II 159). 
The instruction requested by defense counsel was: 
To warrant you in convicting the defendant of the 
crime charged in the information, or of any crime 
included there, the evidence must, to your minds, 
exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than 
that of guilt of the defendant; that is to say, 
if after a full and fair consideration and 
comparison of all the testimony in the case you 
can reasonably explain the facts in evidence on 
any reasonable ground other than the guilt of the 
defendant, then you must find him not guilty. (R.58) 
The instruction given by the court below was : 
All presumptions of law, independant of 
evidence, are in favor of innocence, and a 
defendant is presumed innocent until he is 
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And 
in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether his 
guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to 
an acquittal. 
I have heretofore told you that the burden is 
upon the State to prove the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Now, by reasonable 
doubt is meant a doubt that is based on reason 
and one which is reasonable in view of all the 
evidence. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is 
that degree of proof which satisfies the mind 
and convinces the understanding of those who are 
bound to act conscientiously upon it. A 
reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable 
men and women would entertain, and it must arise 
from the evidence or the lack of the evidence 
in this case. 
If after an impartial consideration and comparison 
of all the evidence in the case you can candidly 
say that you are not satisfied of the defendant's 
guilt, you have a reasonable doubt. But if after 
such impartial consideration and comparison of all 
the evidence you can truthfully say that you have an 
abiding conviction of the defendant's guilt such 
as you will be willing to act upon in the more 
weighty and important matters relating to your 
own affairs, you have no reasonable doubt. A 
reasonable doubt must be a rea! substantial doubt 
and not one that is merely possible or imaginary 
(R.77). 
The question of whether an entirely circumstantial 
case mandates a reasonable hypothesis instruction is not clearly 
answered by the law in this jurisdiction. There does exist, 
however, persuasive authority for proposing that in Utah an 
alternative reasonable instruction must be given where a case 
against a defendant is completely circumstantial. 
In State v. Dumas, 554 P.2d 1313, 1315 (Utah 1976), this 
court held that not giving a reasonable hypothesis jury instruction 
was not error where the evidence before the jury was not 
entirely circumstantial: 
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The trial court refused to give the instruction 
because the evidence in the case was not entirely 
circumstantial. We think he did not err in his 
refusal. In this case there was direct, positive 
evidence that the defendant, Dumas, was a knowing 
participant in the commission of the robbery. There 
were no inferred facts to be explained on any 
hypothesis, reasonable or unreasonable. It was 
a question of credibility to be given to the 
witnesses. 
In the present case, all that exists are inferred 
facts; the case is entirely circumstantial. Dumas mandates 
the use of the alternative reasonable hypothesis instruction 
in this case. Justice Ellett concluded in Dumas, supra at 
1316: !!where the only proof of material fact or one which is 
a necessary element of defendant's guilt consists of circum-
stantial evidence, such circumstances must reasonably preclude 
every reasonable hypothesis of defendant's innocence." 
Mr. Withers and Mr. Ellis contend that a mere reasonable 
doubt instruction lulls the jury into a stagnant, uncreative 
focus on the theory of the facts as the prosecution has 
presented them—especially if the defendants are somehow 
unappealling characters; the alternative reasonable hypothesis 
instruction is more likely to invest the ]ury with a proper 
sense of their duty to rule out reasonable alternative theories 
about what the defendants were doing on the night in question 
before a guilty verdict can be returned. A trial court should 
do everything within its power to ensure that a jury, faced 
with deciphering a case of 1007o circumstantial evidence, knows 
precisely what reasonable doubt means. The reasonable hypothesis 
instruction is a simple way for the trial court to fulfill this 
obligation to the jury. The defendants respectfully submit 
that the lower court's failure to give the iury a reasonable 
hypothesis instruction constitutes reversible error. 
POINT V 
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF MISTAKES AT TRIAL 
CONSTITUTES REVERSlBLfi ERROR. 
The defendants have pointed to several errors bearing 
upon their conviction in the court below. All of the inadmissible 
testimony and evidence, the Court's failure to sever the 
defendants1 trial, the insufficiency of the evidence and the 
lack of an adequate jury instruction combine to create 
reversible error in this case. Although we cannot know what 
evidence the jury considered in reaching its verdict, the 
amount of inappropriate evidence that was admitted, and the 
amount of prejudicial error that was committed, itfi this case 
cannot be ignored. 
The cumulative effect of these errors, if not the 
individual errors themselves, warrants a new trial. In 
Gooden v. State, 617 P.2d 248, 250 (Okl. Crim. ADD. 1980), 
the State Court held: 
When a revieitf of the entire record reveals 
numerous irregularities that tend to prejudice 
the rights of a defendant and where an 
accumulation of errors denies a defendant a » 
fair trial, the case will be reversed, even 
though one of the errors, standing alone, would 
not be ample to justify reversal. 
The prejudicial effect of the errors in this case 
cannot be quantified. Nevertheless, no juror could have 
ignored all of the inadmissible evidence and imoroper court 
instructions. The judgment below must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The court below abused its discretion in refusing 
to sever the defendants1 joint trial after ruling the 
defendants1 contradictory, out of court statements were 
admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule. By 
refusing the defendants1 motion to sever, the trial court 
effectively allowed the prosecution to try the defendants 
ex parte because the statements were not entered in a 
form subject to cross examination. The defendants were 
denied their essential Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation 
and effective assistance of counsel. The court committed 
further serious error by allowing a lay witness to offer 
what amounted to expert opinion testimony. This inadmissible 
evidence, coupled with the rest of the prosecution's entirely 
circumstantial case, however, was still not enough to 
reasonably warrant a verdict against the defendants. Under 
Utah law, the state did not bear its burden of proof with 
respect to either the actus reus or the mens rea of the 
crime charged against the defendants. The trial court should 
have granted defense counselsf motions to arrest judgment 
based on the insufficiency of the evidence. Finally, the 
court below erred in not giving the alternative reasonable 
hypothesis instruction requested by defense counsel. Because 
of these errors and their seriously prejudicial cumulative 
effect, the defendants request that their convictions be 
reversed and that their cases be remanded for new and separate 
trials, or, in the alternative, that the charges against them 
be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted this '°" day of December, 
1985 
KAREN JENNINGS 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
CURTIS NESSET 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
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CURTIS NESSET 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MOTION TO SEVER 
Plaintiff 
v. 
GARY LYNN ELLIS, : Case No. CR-84-501 
Defendant 
The defendant, GARY LYNN ELLIS, by and through his attorney 
of record, CONNIE L. MOWER, hereby moves to sever his trial from 
his co-defendant, MARTY R. WITHERS aka MARTY WOLF, on the grounds 
and for the reason that a joint trial would violate the defendant's 
right to confrontation of witnesses against him as stated in Article 
I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah and the 6th and 14th 
Amendments of the United States Constitution as interpretated 
in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). 
DATED this -jr day of May, 1984. 
v/^e^ 
CONNIE L. MOWER 
Attorney for Defendant 
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Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
-v-
MARTY R. WITHERS aka WOLF and 
GARY LYNN ELLIS, 
Co-Defendants 
MOTION TO SFVERE AND 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Case No. CR84-501 
HOMER F. WILKINSON 
The co-defendants, MARTY R. WITHERS aka WOLFE and 
GARY LYNN ELLIS, by and throuqh their attorneys of record, 
LISA A. MAXFIELD and CONNIE L. MOWER, hereby moves to sever 
their trials from the other co-defendant on the grounds and 
for the reason that a joint trial would violate their 
defendant's rights to confrontation of witnesses against 
them as stated in Articles I, Section 12 of the Constitution 
of Utah and the 6th or 14th Amendments of the United States 
Constitution as interpretated in Bruton v. United States, 
391 U.S. 123 (1968) . 
•u 
DATED this 2£f< day of July, 1984. 
LISA A. MAXFIELD 
Attorney for co-defendant"Withers 
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.Clerk 
.Reporter 
.Bailiff 
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DATE: 
Based upon 
counsel for the 
orders the 
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• Based on Court's motion, the Court hereby orders the trial reset to 
for the reason of 
• The above named defendant having been granted a stay of execution of sentence to this date. Now on the court's owr 
motion and good cause appearing therefor, it is ordered that said defendant be granted a further stay of execution 01 
sentence to 
• The above named defendant having been granted a stay of execution of sentence to this date. Now on the court's owi 
motion and good cause appearing therefor, it is ordered that the probation of said defendant is terminated and he i 
released from supervision. 
.an< D Based on non-appearance of the defendant 
on • motion of the County Attorney or • Court's own motion, it is ordered that a bench warrant issue for sai< 
deft, returnable forthwith Q No Bail • Bail $ . 
• Based upon motion of counsel for the State and good cause appearing therefor, it is ordered that the above entitled cas 
be and same is dismissed for the reason of 
• Based upon entry of defendant's plea in case no: 
the State, it is ordered that the above entitled case be and same is dismissed. 
• APPD Notified • Called 
and on motion of counsel fc 
.at APF 
• Placed copy of M. E. in APPD Box 
• APPD Agent Present 
FILED IN CLERK-S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County. Utah 
AUG 27 1984 
Bv -*r*"~- •— rwmtv Clerk 
LISA A. MAXFIELD #2128 
Attorney for Defendant 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association By
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Deputy lerk 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
-v-
MARTY WITHERS aka WOLFE, 
Defendant 
MOTION FOR ARREST OF 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. CR84-501 
HOMER F. WILKINSON 
The defendant, MARTY WITHERS aka WOLFE, by and through 
his attorney, LISA A. MAXFIELD, hereby moves this Court pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §77-35-23 (1953 as amended) to arrest judgment 
in the above-entitled case. 
Defendant bases his motion on the grounds that after 
the jury verdict was read, his co-defendant told the prosecutor 
that Mr. Withers did, in fact, pass out from alcohol consumption 
on the evening of the alleged burglary; and that Mr. Withers 
played no part and had no knowledge of a burglary. 
The prosecutor, Mr. Harward, then indicated that he 
would join the defense in a motion to arrest judgment. 
The defendant also submits that there' wqrs insu/ficient 
evidence presented agcii^ rslfhim upon whicnteOoase k gfiiil/ty verdict, 
SUBMITTED this 27 day of Augusj 
CONNIE L. MOWER #2339 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
Attorney for Defendant 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FILED IN OUERK'9 OFFICE 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
SEP i 01984 
Deputy Clerk 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
GARY LYNN ELLIS, 
Defendant 
MOTION FOR ARREST 
OF JUDGMENT 
Case *T0. CR-S4-501 
WOMER F. WILKINSON 
The defendant, GARY LYNN ELLIS, by and through his attorney 
of record, CONNIE L. MOWER, hereby moves this Court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-23 (1953 as amended) to arrest judgment 
in the above entitled case. Defendant bases his motion on the 
grounds that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial 
upon which the jury could properly render a verdit of guilty. 
DATED this day of Seotember, 1984. 
LilH^ 
CONNIE L. MOWER 
Attorney for Defendant 
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motion and good cause appearing therefor, it is ordered that the probation of said defendant is terminated and he is 
released from supervision. 
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on Q motion of the County Attorney or • Court's own motion, it is ordered that a bench warrant issue for said 
deft, returnable forthwith Q No Bail • Bail $ . 
Based upon motion of counsel for the State and good cause appearing therefor, it is ordered that the above entitled case 
be and same is dismissed for the reason of 
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the State, it is ordered that the above entitled case be and same is dismissed. 
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